The Manufacturer\u27s Failure to Halt Trading Stamps as a Bar to Relief Under the Fair Trade Laws by unknown
THE MANUFACTURER'S FAILURE TO HALT TRADING
STAMPS AS A BAR TO RELIEF UNDER
THE FAIR TRADE LAWS*
FAIR trade laws 1 permit the manufacturer of a trade-marked article to estab-
lish and maintain a uniform resale price,2 and provide that reselling below
*Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Max Dichter & Sons, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 545 (D. Mass. 1956).
1. Forty-five states have passed these acts. Only the legislatures of Vermont, Texas,
Missouri and the District of Columbia have failed to enact fair trade statutes. 1 CCH
TRADE REG. REP. ff 3003 (1956). All the acts are similar, having been based on models
provided by the National Association of Retail Druggists. The California act, after
receiving approval in The Pep Boys, Manny, Moe & Jack v. Pyroil Sales Co., 299 U.S.
198 (1936), became the model statute for at least sixteen states. The NARD later
drafted a new model act which differed in some respects from the California act and
has been adopted in at least nineteen states. See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COM-
mISS ON ON RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE xxvii-xxviii, 67-71 (1945) (hereinafter cited
as FTC FAIR TRADE REP.); 1 CALLMAN, UNFAIR COIPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS § 22.2
(2d ed. 1950) ; Note, 52 HARv. L. REv. 284, 285 (1938). These statutes are frequently,
and hereinafter will be, distinguished as "old type" and "new type." 1 CALLMAN, Op. Cit.
supra at 443.
In thirteen of these forty-five states, however, fair trading is not in full force. 1 CCH
TRADE REG. REP. 'f 3003 (1956). The statutes succeed in permitting the manufacturer to
maintain a uniform resale price only when they enable him to prevent price cutting by
dealers who refuse to sign his resale price maintenance contracts. Fulda, Resale Price
Maintenance, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 175, 176 (1954). Statutory provisions of this sort-
nonsigner clauses-have been exempted from prohibition under the federal antitrust laws
by the McGuire Act, 66 STAT. 632, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1952). See Schwegmann Bros. Giant
Super-Markets v. Eli Lilly & Co., 205 F.2d 788 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 856
(1953) (McGuire held constitutional). But see Sunbeam Corp. v. Richardson, CCH
TRADE REG. REP. (1956 Trade Cas.) 'f 68407 (W.D. Ky. July 16, 1956) (McGuire
held unconstitutional). See also REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL Com-
MITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 149-52 (1955) (discussing prior legislation which
failed to protect nonsigner clauses) ; Fulda, supra at 176-77; Note, 69 -ARv. L. REv. 316,
316-18 (1955). But state courts, free to pass on the constitutionality of fair trade legisla-
tion, have in recent months declared several of the acts invalid, at least as applied to non-
signers. See Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. Francis, CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1956
Trade Cas.) ff 68463 (Colo. Aug. 27, 1956) ; General Elec. Co. v. American Buyers Co-
operative, Inc., CCH TRADE REc. REP. (1956 Trade Cas.) 1 68341 (Ky. Cir. Ct. May 2,
1956) ; General Elec. Co. v. Wahle, CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1956 Trade Cas.) ff 68333
(Ore. April 18, 1956); Dr. G. H. Tichenor Antiseptic Co. v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant
Super-Markets, CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1956 Trade Cas.) 1 68400 (La. June 29, 1956) and
cases cited in Notes, 65 YALE L.J. 235, 241 n.34 (1955) ; 69 HARV. L. REV. 316, 318 n.24
(1955). Other courts have gone beyond the nonsigner provisions in invalidating the acts.
See General Elec. Co. v. Thrifty Sales, CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1956 Trade Cas.) ff 68482
(Utah Sept. 22, 1956) (act held unconstitutional as to both signers and nonsigners);
Benrus Watch Co. v. Kirsch, CCH TRADE REG. REp. (1956 Trade Cas.) II 68319 (Va.
April 23, 1956) (act in conflict with the state antitrust laws is inoperative). The argu-
ments on fair trade constitutionality are discussed in Fulda, supra at 206-11; Notes, 4
J. PuB. L. 469 (1955) ; 69 Hi-tv. L. REv. 316, 349 (1955) ; 45 ILL. L. REv. 378 (1950).
2. Under the "new type" statute only the trade-mark owner or a distributor specifically
NOTES
this price is unfair competition.3 The most effective method for manufacturers
and dealers to enforce their rights under the statutes is to obtain injunctions
against dealers who engage in price cutting.4 Such violators, however, fre-
quently defend against injunctions by showing that the plaintiff manufacturer
has failed to enforce his resale price maintenance contracts against other
dealers.5 Although the statutes do not explicitly recognize this defense,0 its
authorized may establish a fair trade price. Courts construing "old type" statutes have
not been uniform in determining which persons in the distribution chain may fix fair trade
prices. Compare Frank Fischer Merchandising Corp. v. Ritz Drug Co., 129 N.J. Eq.
105, 19 A.2d 454 (Ch. 1941) (wholesaler may establish price without consent of trade-mark
owner), with Automotive Elec. Serv. Corp. v. Times Square Stores Corp., 175 Misc.
865, 24 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (only owner of trade-mark may establish fair trade
price) ; 1 CALLMAN, op. cit. mtpra note 1, at § 24.1 (b) ; Note, 52 HARV. L. Rzv. 284, 287
(1938).
3. The cause of action established by these acts is in tort for unfair competition.
Early in the history of fair trade litigation it was thought that the statutes created an
equitable servitude in favor of the manufacturer, but under that theory a competing
dealer would not have standing to enforce the restrictions. See 1 CALLMfAIN, op. Cit. supra
note 1, at § 24.3 (a) ; Shulman, The Fair Trade Acts and the Law of Restrictive Agree-
ments Affecting Chattels, 49 YALE L.J. 607 (1940); Notes, 52 HARv. L. REV. 284, 293
(1938); 25 NoTRE DAmE LAW. 529 (1950). See also note 4 hifra.
The "new type" statutes are aimed at preventing selling at less than a minimum
price. The "old type" acts held that any selling "except at the price stipulated" is
actionable. Because the forces of competition will not usually allow selling above the pro-
scribed minimum, this distinction is not of consequence. See WEIGEL, THE FAIR TRADE
AcTs 41 (1938) ; 1 CALLMAN, Op. cit. supra note 1, at § 24.1(c).
4. Enforcement against violators of fair trade laws is generally pursued by private
litigation. Fulda, supra note 1, at 202; Note 65 YALE L.J. 235 (1955). Some states provide
that government officials may take action to enforce these acts but the use of these powers
has not been extensive. See Fulda, supra note 1, at 205-06; Notes, 65 YALE L.J. 235 n.3
(1955) ; 69 HARV. L. Rv. 316, 352 n.200 (1955).
The statutes providing that violations are actionable by "'any person injured thereby"
have been construed to allow not only the manufacturer but also competing dealers, whether
or not they have signed a fair trade contract, to bring enforcement suits. Port Chester
Wine & Liquor Shop, Inc. v. Miller Bros. Fruiterers, Inc., 281 N.Y. 101, 22 N.E.2d 253
(1939); Broxmeyer v. Polikofi, 39 Pa. D. & C. 224 (C.P. 1940); Note, 65 YALE L.J.
235, 236 n.4 (1955). See also FTC FAIR TRADE REP. 75; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:4-6
(Supp. 1956) (giving retailers a cause of action).
Although violations may entail liability in damages, injunctions are more usually
-ought because of the difficulty of establishing a causal relationship between defendant's
price cuts and plaintiff's loss of sales. See Notes, 65 Y.%LE L.J. 235, 236 n.4 (1955) ; 69
H.xv. L. REv. 316, 321, 340-43 (1955).
5. The defense of manufacturer's nonenforcement may not be available against enforce-
nent suits by retailers. Stockman v. Wilson Distilling Co., 175 Misc. 314, 23 N.Y.S.2d
510 (Sup. Ct. 1940) ; cf. Weissbard v. Potter Drug & Chemical Corp., 6 N.J. Super. 541,
t)9 A.2d 559 (Ch. 1949) (defense only if manufacturer's omissions amount to abandon-
ment). But see Pordes v. Lythe, 137 N.Y.S.2d 422 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (dealer's complaint
must allege an active program of enforcement); Kline v. Davega City Radio Co.,
168 Misc. 185, 4 N.Y.S.2d 541 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
Other defenses available to a price cutter, in addition to the unconstitutionality argu-
ment discussed in note 1 snpra, are that he: sold only damaged goods; sold under court
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merit is obvious: as long as the manufacturer permits other dealers to cut,
to enjoin one dealer from cutting prices would prevent the latter from meet-
ing his competition.7 But frequently the courts discuss the defense of nonen-
forcement in different terms. By relying upon the clean hands doctrine and
similar equity principles, courts suggest that any failure to pursue a reason-
able and diligent enforcement program bars the manufacturer,8 without regard
to the magnitude of the dealer's wrongdoing. Thus the courts have intimated
that the defense of nonenforcement may protect a dealer who has cut prices
more than was necessary to meet the competition fostered by the manufacturer's
omissions.
The scope of the nonenforcement defense was thoroughly tested for the first
time in the recent case of Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Max Dichter & Sons, Inc. '
Colgate brought proceedings to enjoin price cutting by a group of defendants
who, the court found, had "consistently and willfully sold below [fair trade]
order; sold to a government agency; cut price by mistake; had no notice of fair trade
contract; or purchased the goods before fair trade was initiated. See Notes, 69 HARV. L.
R.v. 316, 320 (1955) ; 27 VA. L. REv. 518 (1941).
6. General Elec. Co. v. R. H. Macy & Co., 199 Misc. 87, 103 N.Y.S.2d 440 (Sup. Ct),
appeal dismissed, 278 App. Div. 939, 940, 105 N.Y.S.2d 1003, 1001 (1st Dep't 1951);
Calvert Distillers Corp. v. Nussbaum Liquor Store, Inc., 166 Misc. 342, 2 N.Y.S.2d 320
(Sup. Ct. 1938).
7. General Elec. Co. v. S. Klein-on-the-Square, Inc., 121 N.Y.S.2d 37, 54 (Sup. Ct.
1953) ; Automotive Elec. Serv. Corp. v. Times Square Stores Corp., 175 Misc. 865, 872, 24
N.Y.S.2d 733, 741 (Sup. Ct. 1940). Contra, National Distillers Products Corp. v. Columbus
Circle Liquor Stores, Inc., 166 Misc. 719, 2 N.Y.S.2d 319 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
8. See, e.g., Wilson Distilling Co. v. Stockman, 11 N.Y.S.2d 51 (Sup. Ct. 1939)
(plaintiff has not come into equity with clean hands) ; Hutzler Bros. v. Remington Putnam
Book Co., 186 Md. 210, 46 A.2d 101 (1946) ("He who seeks equity must do equity");
Lentheric, Inc. v. Weissbard, 122 N.J. Eq. 573, 195 Atl. 818 (Ch. 1937) (same) ; Frank
Fischer Merchandising Corp. v. Ritz Drug Co., 129 N.J. Eq. 105, 19 A.2d 454 (Ch. 1941)
("equality is equity" is fundamental to the fair trade act).
9. 142 F. Supp. 545 (D. Mass. 1956).
The Massachusetts fair trade law, MAss. ANN. LAWs c. 93, §§ 14 A-D (Supp. 1955),
wider which this action was brought, is an example of the "old type" statute. FTC FAIR
TRADE REP. 71. The constitutionality of the statute was upheld in General Elec. Co. v.
Kimball Jewelers, Inc., 132 N.E.2d 652 (Mass. 1956).
In a few prior injunction suits a defense comparable to that in Dichter was raised. But
in each of these cases the court determined that the practice allegedly tolerated by the
manufacturer did not amount to a violation and that his acquiescence or nonenforcement
could therefore be no defense. See Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Springfield Home
Appliances, Inc., 1955 Trade Cas. ff 67970 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955) (plaintiff sold to
premium houses); General Elec. Co. v. Two Guys from Harrison, Inc., CCH TRADE;
REG. REP. (1956- Trade Cas.) 68458 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954) (same); Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. v. Charles, 1954 Trade Cas. 1 67838 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954) (plaintiff sold to
clubs and initiated "soap coupon plan") ; Sunbeam Corp. v. Central Housekeeping Mart,
Inc., 1952-53 Trade Cas. ff 67379 (Ill. Super. Ct. 1952), reversed on other grounds,
2 Ill. 2d 543, 120 N.E.2d 362 (1954) (plaintiff's sales at less than fair trade prices at army
posts no violation, but allegations that it tolerated sales to department store employees
raises a triable issue) ; Sunbeam Corp. v. Klein, 32 Del. Ch. 65, 79 A.2d 603 (Ch. 1951)
(plaintiff's toleration of sales on credit by defendant's competitors).
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prices."'10 The defendants answered that by permitting other dealers to give
trading stamps 11 on the sale of fair traded items, Colgate had failed to pursue
a reasonable and diligent campaign of enforcement and consequently was not
entitled to an injunction. Many of Colgate's other dealers admittedly engaged
in trading stamp practices.'2 Individually they agreed with a trading stamp
company that it would issue stamps to the dealer, and would redeem the
stamps from the dealer's customers. 3 The dealers than gave their customers
one stamp for each ten cents of their total purchases. The customers accu-
mulated the stamps until they had enough to exchange them at the stamp com-
pany's outlet store for merchandise valued at 22 percent of the customers'
gross purchases. 14 Colgate and intervening plaintiff Sperry and Hutchinson, a
trading stamp company, argued that the practice did not constitute a reduction
10. 142 F. Supp. at 547.
11. Although trading stamps have been in existence since late in the 1800's their
largest gains have come about within the last five years. A Business Service Bulletin
from the United States Department of Commerce estimates that stamps are saved by
forty million American families, and surveys have indicated that in some areas 70% to 90%
of the families are avid stamp collectors. An estimated 200,000 retailers throughout the
country distribute these premiums to their customers, but the device has won unanimous
support from neither consumers nor dealers. Dealers claim they are forced to use stamp
plans to meet competition and that the stamps' cost exceeds their consumer attraction
force. Many consumer groups argue that the stamps effect no bargain at all, but that
ultimately the consumer foots the bill. Notwithstanding these challenges, as well as
attacks by legislatures, the trading stamps are now big business. See U.S. News and
World Report, Nov. 9, 1956, p. 112; What's Behind the Trading Stamp Boom?, 21 Cox-
SUMER REPS. 506 (1956) ; Comment, The Trading Stamp, 24 TENN. L. REV. 557 (1956) ;
New Haven Evening Register, Oct. 17, 1956, p. 47, col. 1; New York Times, Sept. 30, 1956,
§ 3, p. 1, col. 2.
12. Thuugh the operation of Sperry and Hutchinson is described here most other
stamp companies seem to follow a similar pattern.
Some dealers allow a rebate to consumers who save cash register receipts. This plan
has been construed by the courts to have the same effect as the trading stamp practice.
Bristol-Myers Co. v. Picker, 302 N.Y. 61, 96 N.E.2d 177 (1950).
13. The absence of any agreement between the retailer and the trading stamp com-
pany is the most distinguishing feature of the cash register receipt program. In effect
the retailer is creating his own trading stamps. This difference becomes minimal where
several retailers combine to form a joint cash register receipts program; the customer
obtains receipts from all member stores, and he may redeem them for the merchandise of
any member he chooses. See Bristol-Myers Co. v. Picker, supra note 12.
14. 142 F. Supp. at 548. The estimated value of a filled stamp book varies with whether
the premium is figured at its full fair trade price, a discount price, or the wholesale price. Also
the number of stamps needed to fill a book is not uniform among the stamp companies. Most of
the commentators do not indicate the figures used to obtain their estimates. See Comment,
24 TEaN. L. Ra,. 557, 565-66 (1956) (book worth $2.00, cost $120 in purchases: 1.67%) ;
21 CONSUMER RaPs. 506, 509 (1956) (book worth $2.50, cost $120 to $150 in purchases:
1.67-2.08%); U.S. News & World Report, Nov. 9, 1956, p. 112 (book worth $3.40, cost
$130 in purchases: 2.61%).
Under the cash register receipts plan the retailer may set his own premium rate. See
Bristol-Myers Co. v. Picker, 302 N.Y. 61, 96 N.E.2d 177 (1950). Similarly a change in the
effective rate of premiums from trading stamps can be made by the dealer's allowing
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in the purchase price of the fair traded item, but was merely an "innocuous dis-
count for cash."'15 And even if they were deemed to be a reduction in price,
plaintiffs argued, trading stamps effected such a slight discount that the reduction
should be disregarded.' 6
The court refused to grant a preliminary injunction until Colgate could
show that it was taking appropriate steps to eliminate the trading stamp
practice. In holding that trading stamps were condemned by the fair trade
statute, the court relied upon a distinction familiar to accountants. It agreed
with plaintiff that if the stamps were viewed as cash discounts they might be
legal since this type of discount is not generally considered a reduction in
the purchase price. But the court reasoned that because the entire operation
resembled a quantity discount,'1 7 trading stamps were also a "trade discount,"
which does, according to accepted accounting practice, reduce the purchase
price.' 8 Furthermore, the discount, although small, nevertheless violated the
double stamps on purchases. See Weco Products Co. v. Mid-City Cut Rate Drug Stores,
55 Cal. App. 2d 684, 131 P.2d 856 (1942).
In some instances the stamps may be redeemed at the distributing retailer's place of
business. See, 'e.g., Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Margetts, 15 N.J. 203, 104 A.2d 310
(1954) ; Bristol-Meyers Co. v. Lit Bros., 336 Pa. 81, 6 A.2d 843 (1939).
Plans operating in some states allow the consumer to choose a cash refund rather
than merchandise when redeeming the coupons. See Weco Products Co. v. Mid-City Cut
Rate Drug Stores, supra. See also KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-2210 (Supp. 1955) (stamps
which do not show cash value on their face may be distributed only by licensed, heavily
taxed outlets) ; WASH. REv. CODE § 19.84 (1956) (prohibiting stamps unless cash value
printed on each stamp).
15. 142 F. Supp. at 548.
16. Id. at 549.
17. Quota discounts are based upon the volume of purchases and often can only be
determined after a lapse of time. PATON, ACCOUNTANT'S HANDBOOK 304-05 (3d ed. 1945).
The court felt trading stamps fell within this category because a large number of stamps
must be accumulated before the consumer obtains any value for them.
"Trading stamps have no value unless and until one fills a whole book. The average
customer of a supermarket purchases about $4 worth of goods at a time. He gets
no 'cash' discount for this, alone. He earns his discount only by visiting S. & H.
licensees enough more times to spend $120."
142 F. Supp. at 549.
"Besides the direct one I believe there is an additional psychological quantity
discount. S. & H. redeems only in merchandise. The more attractive premiums require
several books, and doubtless they are what most persons want. Relatively few
would be satisfied with a one-book three dollar toaster."
Id. at 549 n.5.
18. Many courts have relied upon this analysis in determining whether trading stamps
do effect a price cut but most of them have concluded that trading stamps are a legal
cash discount. See, e.g., Weco Products v. Mid-City Cut Rate Drug Stores, 55 Cal. App.
2d 684, 131 P.2d 856 (1942) ; Nechankin v. Picker, 189 Misc. 61, 67 N.Y.S.2d 60 (Sup.
Ct. 1946) (citing MONTGOMERY, AUDITING THEORY AND PRActicE). The nature of a
cash discount is widely disputed among accounting authorities. Those who maintain that
cash discounts do not alter prices do so in order to distinguish between the financial and
operational aspects of a business for purposes of evaluating management on a consistent
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statute; the court found the trading stamp operation so widespread as to be
a potential cause of the retaliatory price cutting the fair trade laws were de-
signed to prevent. Consequently, although it found that this prevalent use of
trading stamps was not the cause of defendants' price cutting,'9 the court
held that Colgate had failed to pursue a reasonable and diligent enforcement
program and was barred from injunctive relief.20
In sum, the court's interpretation of the defense of nonenforcement allows
a manufacturer to fair trade his product only if he effectively forbids not only
trading stamps but also any promotional scheme which may be deemed equiva-
lent to a price cut of any size. This view fails to relate the granting of an in-
junction to the two major goals of the fair trade laws: 1) protection of the
small retailers, 21 and 2) protection of the goodwill of the manufacturer's
product.22 As to the first, relief should be denied if, on balance, an injunction
would impair a defendant's competitive position or the interests of those dealers
who observed fair trade restrictions. But neither of these harms would have
followed from the granting of an injunction in Dichter. This is true even if,
as some states hold, the trading stamp operation is a form of competition pro-
hibited by the fair trade laws.2 3 Although trading stamps may conceivably lead
to the costly retaliatory wars the statutes were enacted to prevent, only rarely
basis. The authorities who argue that cash discounts do adjust prices point out that these
discounts are almost universally taken and no one expects to pay any more than the dis-
counted price. This latter theory would seem more appropriately applied in the trading
stamp situation. PATON, AccouNTANT's HANDBOOK 201, 304-05, 409-11 (3d ed. 1945)
(collecting authorities).
For a discussion of whether accounting distinctions should govern the legality of
trading stamps, see 63 HARV. L. REv. 366 (1949). See also notes 23 and 32 infra.
19. 142 F. Supp. at 548.
20. The court established that Colgate's toleration did not amount to unclean hands
or waiver such that it would be permanently barred from relief; Colgate could obtain
an injunction against the defendants by opposing the heretofore tolerated violations.
After the original opinion Colgate adopted the court's view that the stamps in part
reduced prices below the fair trade minimum. The court, satisfied as to the steps Colgate
was taking to enforce against the trading stamp practice, granted a preliminary injunction
against defendants. Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Max Dichter & Sons, Inc., 142 F. Supp.
545, 550 (D. Mass. 1956) (supplementary opinion).
As part of their proceedings against trading stamp violators Colgate brought suits
against five supermarkets who issue stamps or cash register receipts in the Boston area.
Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Stop & Shop, Inc., Mass. Super. Ct. Equity No. 71402-06, 71415
(1956). This case may be presented without a decision by the superior court judge to the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. This practice was followed in the case of
General Elec. Co. v. Kimball Jewelers, 132 N.E.2d 652 (Mass. 1956), which upheld the
constitutionality of the Massachusetts fair trade act.
21. See Note, 65 YALE L.J. 235, 236 n.7 (1955) (collecting authorities).
22. See id. at 236 n.6 (collecting authorities).
23. The following courts have held trading stamps legal under the "old type" fair
trade laws: Weco Products Co. v. Mid-City Cut Rate Drug Stores, 55 Cal. App. 2d 684,
131 P.2d 856 (1942) ; Bristol-Myers Co. v. Lit Bros., 336 Pa. 81, 6 A.2d 843 (1939).
Only New York has found trading stamps illegal. Bristol-Myers Co. v. Picker, 302 N.Y.
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will they be used as a device for aggressive price cutting. 2 4 Defendants were
not likely to be injured in the future by abnormal use of trading stamps, -2 5
nor were they injured by past practices. For, in contrast to the small discount
effected by the trading stamps, 26 defendants' price cuts were often as much as
fifteen to twenty percent.2 7  In this respect defendants' aggressive merchan-
dising policies resembled those of discount houses, 28 which normally rely upon
61, 68, 96 N.E.2d 177, 180 (1950) (dictum). No Massachusetts state court has as yet
passed on the legality of trading stamps.
"For the purpose of preventing evasions of the resale price restrictions" the "new type"
statutes specifically designate that gifts, coupons and combination sales are a violation
of the act unless authorized by the fair trade manufacturer. FTC FAIR TnADE REP. 82;
1 CALL-MAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 24.2(c). Manufacturers have successfully used
these provisions to enjoin trading stamps. The Mennen Co. v. Katz, 1950-51 Trade Cas.
11 62734 (Conn. Ct. C.P. 1950) ; Lambert Pharmacal Co. v. Roberts Bros., 1950-51 Trade
Cas. 11 62669 (Ore. Cir. Ct. 1950), rev'd on other grounds, 192 Ore. 23, 233 P.2d 258 (1951).
Other dealer practices have been alleged by the manufacturer to be indirect price
cutting and injunctions have been requested. Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. Simon, 33 F.
Supp. 962 (E.D. Mich. 1940) (sales tax absorbed by dealer; injunction denied) ; Bristol-
Myers Co. v. L. Bamberger & Co., 122 N.J. Eq. 559, 195 Atl. 625 (Ch. 1937), aff'd pcr curianz,
124 N.J. Eq. 235, 1 A.2d 332 (Ct. Err. & App. 1938) (discounts to dealers' employees;
injunction granted); Bernhard v. Savall Drug Store, Inc., 82 N.Y.S.2d 122 (Sup. CL
1948) (gift to all persons who entered the store; injunction denied).
24. Trading stamps have lead to competition resembling a price war in only one
known instance. That outbreak, in Denver, Colorado, in 1953, was halted when the stamp
companies themselves convinced the retailers to stop the suicidal techniques. Business Week,
Oct. 17, 1953, p. 54; Comment, 24 TENN. L. REv. 557 (1956). The arrangement between
the stamp companies and the retailers may account for the lack of retaliatory actions. No
stamps are sold to these stores; rather the retailers are licensed to issue stamps at the
rate of one for every ten cents of sales. If the dealer attempts to compete by giving more
than that number of stamps, his contract may be cancelled. See Sperry & Hutchinson
Co. Licensing Agreement para. Second (e), (f), Third, on file in Yale Law Library.
25. During the only notable instance of a trading stamp war, dealers were giving four
stamps for each ten cent purchase. The discount effected by this step is at most 10%. See
Business Week, Oct. 17, 1953, p. 54; note 24 supra.
26. The Dichter court did not establish by what amount the trading stamps "cut price."
At the most the reduction was 2/%, but the court agreed that part of this f gure might
be considered a legal discount for cash. 142 F. Supp. at 549.
27. Id. at 548.
28. Discount houses whose most rapid advances have come since the close of World
War II, are considered one of the six major innovations in retail distribution since the
Civil War. Conservative surveys estimate that the discount house has appropriated one
third of the electrical appliance market. Most authorities are now convinced that dis-
count outlets are a permanent part of the distribution system. See PALAMIOUN'TAIN, THE
POLITICS OF DIsmmuTIox 6 (1955); Alexander.& Hill, What to do about the Discount
House, Harv. Bus. Rev., Jan.-Feb. 1955, p. 53; Brecher, Discount Houses, 14 CONSUMnx<
REPs. 343, 420,469 (1949), 15 id. at 32 (1950) ; The Hard Sell Comes to the Discount House,
Business Week, Oct. 13, 1956, p. 176. The great attraction of the discount house is re-
duced prices, but the consumer pays for these reductions, at least in part, by receiving fewer
services from these dealers. Typically the discounting dealers offer less liberal credit
terms, less choice in selection because of smaller inventories, and substantially no repair
s'ervice. Trading stamps, on the other hand, are a form of non-price competition. Con-
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their own ability to evade the statute 29 in order to obtain large sales volumes at
the expense of dealers who do maintain the manufacturer's established resale
price.30 Thus, since other dealers could regain volume lost to discount houses
only at great expense and in violation of the statute,31 defendants' price cutting
would harm other dealers much more than would the comparatively mild
competition created by the use of trading stamps. 32 Defendants, moreover,
sumers who are price conscious rather than service conscious will not be dissuaded from
discount buying by an increase in services offered by competitors. See Consumer's Re-
search Bulletin, May 1954, p. 2; 14 CoNsummR REPS. 469, 471 (1949); 15 id. at 32, 34-35
(1950) ; Trading Stamps, Bane or Boom, Business Week, May 19, 1956, pp. 43, 46. This
traditional analysis may have to be revised, however, in the light of recent developments
in the marketing economy. Price discounts have lost part of their attractive force in an
inflationary period. Recent information indicates that discount houses have attempted to
provide additional services for the consumer and some have even adopted trading stamps.
See Selling to an Age of Plenty, Business Week, May 5, 1956, p. 121; The Hard Sell
Comes to the Discount House, supra; Trading Stamps, Bane or Boom, supra.
Defendants differed from the model discount house in that the entire operation was
not controlled by a single management, but rather several concessionaires operated in
one "factory outlet." 142 F. Supp. at 547 nn.1, 2.
29. The discount house uses an arsenal of techniques to avoid the effect of the fair
trade statutes. They attempt to make detection of violations difficult by providing in-
formation on cut prices only to persons identified by cards, by using trade-in allowance
and combination sale devices, and by refusing to give sales slips on fair traded merchandise.
See Notes, 64 HARV. L. REv. 1327, 1333 (1951) ; 69 HARv. L. RFv. 316, 334 (1955);
Fulda, supra note 1, at 203-05; 14 CONSUMTTER REPS. 420 (1949).
After violations have been detected and the fair trade manufacturer brings suit, the
discounters again show their resourcefulness in the defenses they raise to these injunction
actions. See 15 CONSUMER REps. 218 (1950) and cases cited note 9 supra. Nor do in-
junctions cause any halt to the price cutting activities of these outlets. They usually pay,
as a cost of doing business, contempt fines which are awarded to the manufacturer but
which are so small as to be no deterrent to the dealer. See 14 CoNSUM ER REPs. 420
(1949) ; 15 id. at 218 (1950) ; Note, 64 HARv. L. REv. 1327, 1336 (1951).
30. The fair trade laws have had little effect in halting discount house operations.
See note 29 supra. Some authorities maintain that the presence of these laws aids the dis-
count houses in appropriating sales away from dealers who areqobligated to follow the
statutes. See 14 CoNsUMEr RPs. 420, 422 (1949) ; 15 id. at 218 (1950) ; Note, 64 HARv. L.
Rav. 1327, 1332-33 (1951). But it is unfair to imply that the success of the discount house
stems from this exploitation aspect alone. Usually the customer accepts lesser services,
or the dealer is able to offer savings effected through reduced overhead. See Note, 69
HARv. L. REv. 316, 334 (1955). See also authorities cited note 28 supra.
31. At least one small town dealer has attempted to compete with city discount
hooses. However this attempt was met by contempt proceedings, threats of jail sentences,
and phyzical violence at the hands of local fair trade agents. See Fair Trade and Charles
Hawkins, 15 CONSUMER REPS. 220 (1950) ; 20 id. at 141 (1955).
32. Many retailers supporting price maintenance programs have adopted trading
stamps as a competitive device. Available statistics indicate that while there may be as
many as 10,000 outlets which can be classified as discount houses, there are 200,000
retailers who issue trading stamps. Alexander & Hill, op. cit. supra note 28, at 54; U.S.
News & World Report, Nov. 9, 1956, p. 112; Trading Stamps, Bane or Boom, Business
Week, May 19, 1956, p. 43, 48. Although there is some authority for the notion that the
.tatutes prohibit all price competition among fair trading dealers, see Bristol-Myers Co.
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could also easily protect themselves from any adverse effects trading stamps
might have on their competitive position. Since Colgate permitted all dealers
to give trading stamps on the sale of its products, defendants could match any
discounts resulting from Colgate's acquiescence.33
Nor can the decision find support in the traditional rationale of fair trade
legislation-to protect the goodwill of the producer of trade-marked items. 84
Fair trading enables the manufacturer to obtain wide distribution by assuring
his dealers an adequate profit margin; and, by permitting him to establish
and publicize a uniform price, fair trade statutes enable the manufacturer to
increase impulse buying and as a result consumer sales.3 , Prolonged price
cutting tends to reduce the number of outlets selling the product; dealers faced
with a reduced or nonexistent profit margin will be reluctant to stock and sell
the manufacturer's product,3 6 and the consumer, rather than buy on the spot,
v. Picker, 302 N.Y. 61, 96 N.E.2d 177 (1950), the better view seems to be that a limited
amount of competition is permissible. Bristol-Myers Co. v. Lit Bros., 336 Pa. 81, 6 A.2d
843 (1939) ; Fulda, supra note 1, at 201; Note, 64 HARv. L. REv. 1327, 1332 (1951).
Specifically, the statute should be construed to permit competition which does not injure
the manufacturer's goodwill. Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp.,
299 U.S. 183, 193 (1936).
33. Moreover, by its continued acquiescence in the practice, Colgate might be said
to have waived its right to enjoin use of trading stamps. Cf. Frawley Corp. v. Grosslight,
1954 Trade Cas. 67681, at 69190 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1954) (plaintiff waived its right to enjoin
dealers from giving employee discounts) (dictum).
34. Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936).
See also Gever v. American Stores, CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1956 Trade Cas.) ff 68404
(Pa. C.P. June 7, 1956). The harm to goodwill which fair trade purports to avoid is
the sale of a reputable manufacturer's product as a "loss leader." See, e.g., Note, 64
HAav. L. REv. 1327, 1328 (1951). But fair trade accomplishes far more protection than
the elimination of ioss leader selling. For the statute adopts, as its method of protecting
the manufacturer's goodwill, a general limitation on competition among dealers. Bristol-
Myers v. L. Bamberger & Co., 122 N.J. Eq. 559, 195 Atl. 625 (Ch. 1937) ; E. R. Squibb v.
Charlines Cut Rate, 9 N.J. Super. 328, 74 A.2d 354 (Ch. 1950).
Commentators, arguipg from the history of the struggle for fair trade legislation,
have generally agreed that this interest of manufacturers is not the primary concern of
the fair trade statutes but rather a camouflage for dealers who have sought and obtained
exemptions from the antitrust laws to further their own monopolistic efforts. See PAL.-
MOUNTAIN, THE POLITIcs OF DISTRIBUTION cC. IV, VIII (1955) ; Fulda, supra note 1,
at 201; Shulman, supra note 3; Bowman, Resale Price Maintenance-A Monopoly Prob-
lem, J. Bus. U. Chi., July, 1952, p. 141. This latter point of view has been expounded
by a United States District Court while urging the Supreme Court to re-examine their
approval of the fair trade acts in light of these arguments. The invitation was declined.
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super-Markets, 109 F. Supp. 269 (E.D. La.),
aff'd, 205 F.2d 788 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 856, rehcaring denied, 346 U.S. 905
(1953).
35. See Corey, Fair Trade Pricing; A Reappraisal, Harv. Bus. Rev., Sept.-Oct. 1952,
pp. 47, 51-52; Note, 69 HARv. L. Rav. 316, 327 (1955). Sales of consumer staple items,
however, may not increase significantly because of impulse buying.
36. Note, 69 HARy. L. REv. 316, 328 (1955). Such price cutting also risks the possi-
bility that the manufacturer's product will be used as a loss leader. See note 34 supra.
[Vol. 66
NOTES
will prefer to shop for a better bargain. 7 Since trading stamps do not lead
to widespread price wars, 8 the manufacturer may conclude that such compe-
tition does not constitute sufficient harm to his market to warrant the expense
necessary to eliminate it,39 and may accordingly seek to create an exemption
for trading stamp violations.40 To the extent that the act allows manufacturers
to promote their product market, they should be allowed to carve out such ex-
ceptions.
The courts should, however, limit the manufacturer's freedom to create ex-
emptions to the fair trade laws by following the familiar equity procedure of
balancing hardships, 41 thus considering the interests of manufacturers and
dealers both. When a fair trading manufacturer who has acquiesced in some
violations of the statute seeks to enjoin other violations, the courts should
determine whether the greater harm would result from granting or from
denying the injunction.42 This analysis would, for example, grant injunctive
relief to a manufacturer who permits all his dealers to give discounts to their
employees, a practice which does not affect their competitive positions, 43 but
37. Corey, supra note 35, at 60. But cf. Note, 64 HARV. L. REv. 1327, 1329-30 (1951).
38. See notes 24 and 25 supra.
39. Colgate had apparently made such a choice before the proceedings in this case.
It had known of the existence of the trading stamp practice since 1954. See Colgate-
Palmolive Co. v. Elm Farms, Mass. Super. Ct. Eq. No. 71402, Stipulation p. 10 (1956).
40. Although the statutes provide that sales below the fair trade price are action-
able with but three exceptions,-closing out discontinued merchandise, sale of damaged
goods, or sale under court order-the manufacturer may allow more exceptions. Frawley
Corp. v. Grosslight, 1954 Trade Cas. ff 67681 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1954). The "new type"
statutes providing that trading stamps may be a form of violation, see note 23 supra,
specifically provide that these devices may be permitted by choice of the manufacturer.
1 CALLMAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 242 (c).
A manufacturer wishing to allow his dealers to give trading stamps at a specified
rate, should incorporate this exception into his fair trade contracts. See Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. v. Charles Appliances, Inc., 1954 Trade Cas. if 67838 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954)
(soap coupon plan integrated in contract) ; Burroughs Wellcome & Co. v. Weissbard, 129
N.J. Eq. 563, 20 A.2d 445 (Ch. 1941), aff'd per curiam, 130 N.J. Eq. 605, 23 A.2d 396
(Ct. Err. & App. 1942) (enforcing contract which excepted sales to doctors, dentists, etc.;
distinguishing cases where the exception was not included in the contract). But cf.
Frawley Corp. v. Grosslight, 1954 Trade Cas. ff 67681 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1954) (exemption
for discounts to dealers' employees need not be described in contract).
41. General Elec. Co. v. R. H. Macy & Co., 199 Misc. 87, 103 N.Y.S.2d 440, 450 (Sup.
Ct.), appeal dismissed, 278 App. Div. 939, 940, 105 N.Y.S.2d 1003, 1001 (1st Dep't 1951) ;
Chafee, Coming into Equity with Clean Hands, 47 MIcH. L. REV. 877, 1065, 1095 (1949).
But see Palmer v. Angert, 1950-51 Trade Cas. 11 62830 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951) (when
parties both violate the act, equity will not grant relief to either).
42. See General Elec. Co. v. R. H. Macy & Co., supra note 41; General Elec. Co.
v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 1955 Trade Cas. ff 68098 (E.D. Wis. 1955).
43. General Elec. Co. v. S. Klein-on-the-Square, Inc., 121 N.Y.S.2d 37, 49 (Sup.
Ct. 1953) ; General Elec. Co. v. Monarch-Saphin Co., 80 N.Y.S.2d 419 (Sup. Ct., 1948) ;
Frawley Corp. v. Grosslight, 1954 Trade Cas. if 67681 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1954). But see
Bristol-Myers Co. v. L. Bamberger & Co., 122 N.J. Eq. 559, 195 AtI. 625 (Ch. 1937), aff'd
per curiam, 124 N.J. Eq. 235, 1 A.2d 332 (Ct. Err. & App. 1938) (a manufacturer may
enjoin his dealers from giving discounts to his employees). See also Shulman, supra
note 3, at 622; 51 HARv. L. REV. 1305 (1938).
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would deny relief to a manufacturer who discriminates among his dealers.44
And it permits the manufacturer to single out the most flagrant violators for
civil prosecution, thereby minimizing the cost and administrative burden of
enforcing his fair trade program. 45 Courts should recognize the need to protect
consumers and deny injunctions to a manufacturer who fixes a sham fair trade
price merely to give the consumer a false impression of the value of his product4 '
The Dichter court would have obtained a better result by adopting this
analysis. The court should have granted Colgate an injunction regardless
of its acquiescence in the use of trading stamps, even assuming that their use
violates the fair trade laws. For granting the injunction would have caused
little harm to the defendants,47 and no harm to consumers,4 s whereas denying
44. See Gillette Safety Razor Co. v. Green, 167 Misc. 251, 3 N.Y.S.2d 822 (Sup. Ct.
1938) ; James Heddon's Sons v. Callender, 29 F. Supp. 579, 580 (D. Minn. 1939) (dictum) ;
General Elec. Co. v. S. Klein-on-the-Square, Inc., 121 N.Y.S.2d 37, 57 (Sup. Ct. 1953)
(dictum); cf. Calvert Distilling Co. v. Brandon, 24 F. Supp. 857 (W.D.S.C. 1938) (allow-
ances for quantity lots and delivery services do not constitute price discrimination).
The manufacturer may also discriminate against dealers by product differentation,
fair trading only selected products. This practice too should be held to bar the manu-
facturer from injunctive relief when the dealer can show he has been injured. See Note,
69 HARv. L. REv. 316, 345, 351-52 (1955).
45. Strong fair trade producers have been reported to have annual enforcement ex-
penditures as high as one million dollers, and the prospect of so costly a duty has
understandably dissuaded many manufacturers from entering a fair trade program. Sev
Fulda, supra note 1, at 203; Alexander & Hill, supra note 28, at 62; Note, 69 HARv. L.
REv. 316, 329 (1955).
Successful prosecution against the largest violators will usually minimize the cost of
enforcement, for it will both deter aggressive price cutting by smaller dealers and placate
those dealers who cut prices only to meet the competition of the "big fellow." General
Elec. Co. v. S. Klein-on-the-Square, Inc., 121 N.Y.S.2d 37, 56 (Sup. Ct. 1953) ; see also
Note, 69 HARV. L. REv. 316, 328-29 (1955).
46. See Note, 69 HARV. L. Rav. 316, 331-32 (1955) (describing the fair trade pro-
grams undertaken by sham enforcers in order to build an attractive discount house market).
For other cases denying relief to a manufacturer whose laxness seemed to indicate a sham
fair trade program, see Bathasweet Corp. v. Weissbard, 128 N.J. Eq. 135, 15 A.2d 337
(Ch. 1940) (manufacturer abandoned pricing system by marketing combination package
which sold at a price less than the fair trade prices of its components) ; Wilson Distilling
Co. v. Stockman, 11 N.Y.S.2d 51 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (manufacturer abandoned where he
urged sellers to violate the maintained price restrictions) ; Kline v. Davega City Radio,
Inc., 168 Misc. 185, 4 N.Y.S.2d 541 (Sup. Ct. 1938) (manufacturer denied relief where he had
reduced prices to dealers but not the fair trade prices).
47. Defendant would not be forced to maintain prices in an area replete with price
cutters. See also notes 23-33 supra and accompanying text. Nor can he claim a hardship
if he elects not to take advantage of a competitive practice approved by the manufacturer.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Charles Appliances, Inc., 1954 Trade Cas. g 67838 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1954). For examples of distinguishable situations where defendants could show
hardship, see Kline v. Davega City Radio, Inc., supra note 46 (hardship would result if
defendant were enjoined from meeting competition); Automotive Elec. Serv. Corp. v.
Times Square Stores Corp., 175 Misc. 865, 24 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (same);
General Elec. Co. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 1955 Trade Cas. 68098 (E.D. Wi.
1955) (same).
48. The statutes presume that the consumer does not achieve any true benefit from the
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the injunction harmed both the manufacturer and dealers.49 The court forced
Colgate to choose between abandoning fair trade or assuming the costly task of
prohibiting its dealers from distributing trading stamps on its products.50
While the former choice would have denied dealers all fair trade law protec-
tion, the latter may enable discount houses to compete unfairly with impunity,
for Colgate's enforcement task may be impossible to perform.51 Thus applied,
the relative hardship test would give effect to the purposes of the fair
trade laws.52 It is of course true that commentators have frequently
presence of price cutters in the market. "I cannot believe that in the long run the public
will profit by the court permitting knaves to cut reasonable prices. . . ." Holmes, J., dis-
senting, in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373, 412 (1911);
see also views of Brandeis, J., discussed in Comment, 66 YALE L.J. 69, 86-88 (1956), and
WmuEL, op. cit. supra note 3, at 82. But cf. authorities cited note 53 infra.
Moreover, conditioning the granting of relief to a manufacturer upon his eliminating
the issuance of trading stamps on his fair trade products will not eliminate the stamps.
Even if the manufacturer could effectively enjoin this practice, cf. note 51 infra, trading
stamps would be eliminated on but those products sold under fair trade, and the evils
that these stamps allegedly effect would continue with their use on non-fair traded items.
Compare Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 365 (1916) ("They [trading
stamps] tempt by a promise of a value greater than that article and apparently not represented
in its price,... thus by an appeal to cupidity lure to improvidence."), with Sperry & Hutchin-
son Co. v. Director of Division of Necessaries of Life, 307 Mass. 408, 421, 30 N.E.2d
269, 276 (1940) (trading stamps have been in use so long that one is not apt to be deceived
by their value, nor is there reason to believe that their users will resort to fraudulent
practices).
And there is a more basic reason why the fair trade statutes should not be used as a
device for attacking trading stamps. Fair trade laws do not seek to outlaw all forms
of competition. See note 32 supra. Consequently, if the trading stamp operation is thought
to be detrimental to consumers its condemnation should come from specific legislation
and not urged under the auspices of fair trade. See 1 CALLMAN, op. cit. supra note 1,
§ 24.2 (c), at 479 (arguing that fair trade is abused if used to outlaw merchandising methods
which should be eliminated for reasons other than their effect on competition). Regulation
of trading stamps generally is discussed in Wolff, Sales Promotion by Premiums as a
Competitive Practice, 40 COLUm. L. REv. 1174 (1940) ; 41 IowA L. Rtv. 265 (1956). See
also N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1956, p. 65, col. 3 (any general regulation of the stamps might
also lead to curbs on advertising, bargain sales, and other devices used to attract customers).
49. Even during the short interval between the original opinion and the time the
injunction was granted appreciable damage to the manufacturer's fair trade structure
might have occurred. See Note, 69 HARv. L. R.v. 316, 329, 343 (1955). See also General
Elec. Co. v. R. H. Macy & Co., 199 Misc. 87, 98, 103 N.Y.S.2d 440, 451, (Sup. Ct.),
appeal dismissed, 278 App. Div. 939, 940, 105 N.Y.S.2d 1003, 1001 (1st Dep't 1951).
For discussion of the harm to dealers see notes 28-31 supra and accompanying text.
50. Cf. 24 U.S.L. NVEEK 1193 (June 19, 1956).
51. The use of trading stamps is far more extensive than direct price cutting, and
is engaged in by dealers who support fair trade. Also dealers will continue to give trading
stamps on products of other manufacturers, whether fair traded or not, and the isolation
of Colgate items may be a great burden for these retailers. See Alexander & Hill, supra
note 28, at 54; Bristol-Myers Co. v. Lit Bros., 336 Pa. 81, 6 A.2d 843 (1939) ; notes 11
and 32 supra.
52. The fair trade laws purport to protect not only the goodwill of the manufacturer's
product, but also the interests of dealers and the consuming public. See General Elec.
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condemned these goals and the manner in which the fair trade statutes seek
to attain them.53 Nevertheless, the courts should administer the act in a manner
consistent with the legislative determinations of the soundness of these aims,5 4
and should in so doing determine how each decision may affect those interests
the statutes seek to protect.
Co. v. R. H. Macy & Co., 199 Misc. 87, 103 N.Y.S2d 440 (Sup. Ct.), appeal dismissed,
278 App. Div. 939, 940, 105 N.Y.S.2d 1003, 1001 (1st Dep't 1951) ; Note, 65 YALE L.J.
235, 236 (1955) ; H.R. REP. No. 1516, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1952) ; H.R. REP. No.
1292, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 37-39 (1952).
53. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTI-
TRUST LAWS 149-55 (1955); Fulda, supra note 1, at 187 (collecting authorities), 201;
Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 381 (1952) ; Note, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1327 (1951) ; 20 CONSUMERS
REPS. 339 (1955) ; 14 id. at 230 (1949). But see Adams, Resale Price Maintenance; Fact
and Fancy, 64 YALE L.J. 967 (1955) ; together with criticism in Herman, A Note on
Fair Trade, 65 YALE L.J. 23 (1955), and reply in Adams, Fair Trade and the Art of Presti-
digitation, 65 YA.E L.J. 196 (1955).
54. Calvert Distillers Corp. v. Nussbaum Liquor Store, 166 Misc. 342, 344-45, 2
N.Y.S.2d 320, 324 (Sup. Ct. 1938) ; General Elec. Co. v. S. Klein-on-the-Square, Inc., 121
N.Y.S.2d 37, 42 (Sup. Ct. 1953) ; General Elec. Co. v. R. H. Macy & Co., 199 Misc. 87,
91, 103 N.Y.S.2d 440, 445 (Sup. Ct.), appeal dismissed, 278 App. Div. 939, 940, 105
N.Y.S.2d 1003, 1001 (1st Dep't 1951).
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